The United States urged the European Union to expand its list of targeted sanctions of individuals and state-owned enterprises in Zimbabwe following the controversial presidential elections run-off of 2008 which Robert Mugabe won unchallenged after Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai had pulled out because of increased violence.
In a call ahead of the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting in Brussels, the US urged the EU to consider listing all of the individuals and entities subject to the US Zimbabwe sanctions programme.
It also urged the EU to support the US draft resolution which would impose a comprehensive arms embargo as well as an asset freeze and travel ban on those designated as having engaged in or provided support for actions or policies to undermine democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe, including having ordered, planned, or participated in acts of politically motivated violence.
“We need your support for getting the AU, UN, and members of SADC, especially Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, to help to mediate negotiations between Mugabe and MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai,” the US said.
Viewing cable 08STATE75702, APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JULY 22-23
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INFO RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 2747
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 8505
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 7125
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2474
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2758
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 5997
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 3651
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 075702
E.O. 12958: DECL: ASS: 07/14/18
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JULY 22-23
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)
¶1. (U) Classified by Jeffrey Giauque, Senior Political
Officer, EUR/ERA. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
¶2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 12.
¶3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their
next General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) meeting in Brussels on July 22-23. We expect the
formal agenda to include: Somalia, Chad/Sudan/Darfur,
Zimbabwe, and Ukraine. Although Iran is not on the formal
agenda, we expect that it will be discussed. A background
section covering some of these issues is provided prior to
a section containing talking points. Points are to be
delivered as soon as possible at the appropriate level to
EU members only. Other posts should not/not deliver these
points. Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS caption
on their response cables and to reference this cable.
¶4. (C) For several months, we have urged the EU to take
three key steps on Iran: 1) designate a list of additional
entities (including Bank Melli) and individuals associated
with Iran's nuclear and missile programs under existing EU
policy, 2) Adopt UNSCR 1803 into EU policy, and 3) adopt a
series of truly new autonomous measures that go beyond
existing EU policy. On June 23, the EU took the first of
these steps, adding 12 prominent individuals and 14
entities, including Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank, to
its existing designation list for travel bans and asset
¶5. (C) Although the EU has already implemented some parts
of UNSCR 1803 (including the ban on Nuclear Suppliers
Group-controlled dual-use items and by designating all of
the names in the resolution's annex), it has not yet
formally incorporated other parts into EU policy and
regulations, including the calls for additional vigilance
on Iranian banks and inspections of cargo transported by
two specific Iranian shipping and aviation lines involved
in proliferation activities. We had expected the EU to
take these remaining steps on 1803 at its monthly foreign
ministers meeting July 22-23, but the fact that Iran is
not currently on the GAERC agenda suggests this may not
¶6. (C) Beyond implementing 1803 in a robust manner, we
would like the EU to implement the broadest possible
package of additional autonomous measures on which it can
reach consensus. This could include such steps as a ban
on new export credits or a ban on new investments in
Iran's oil and gas sector. Ideally, the EU would
implement these autonomous measures at the same time it
adopted 1803 into EU policy, but if consensus cannot be
reached to act on the autonomous measures so quickly, then
we want the EU to implement the autonomous measures as
soon as possible after it adopts 1803.
¶7. (C) If consensus on strong new EU actions cannot be
reached expeditiously, we hope individual EU Member States
or groups of Member States (a "coalition of the willing")
will take action. We have stressed to the EU that other
key states, including Asian and Middle Eastern countries,
look to the EU to show leadership on Iran. We are hopeful
that others will follow the EU lead on both the June 23
designations and any future steps the EU may take in order
to increase the pressure on Iran as much as possible.
¶8. (C) Pursuing sanctions is entirely consistent with and
supportive of the P5+1 dual track policy. HR Solana
delivered the updated P5+1 incentives package to the
Iranians June 14 and Tehran formally responded to Solana
on July 4. While the Iranian response is still being
studied, we must maintain and increase the pressure until
Iran complies with its obligations. Solana is set to
travel to meet again with Iranian officials to discuss our
offer on July 19; sending an EU signal that it will
STATE 00075702 002 OF 005
¶9. (SBU) The United States continues to support the
transitional political process outlined by Somalia's
Transitional Federal Charter, which provides the mandate
for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and outlines
a process leading to national elections in 2009, as the
best framework for achieving lasting peace and stability
in Somalia. We fully support the June 9 agreement between
the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation for Somalia
(ARS) and will continue to work closely with the United
Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary
General (SRSG), Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, and our
international partners to ensure the agreement is fully
implemented. To ensure that the agreement is successful,
the international community must move quickly to provide
support, including continuing our efforts to improve the
security environment inside Somalia by supporting the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), moving towards
deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, and
undertaking longer-term security sector reform efforts.
We also continue to focus on the issue of piracy and armed
robbery off the coast of Somalia and are working with our
Security Council partners in this regard.
¶10. (SBU) The political, economic and humanitarian
situations remain in flux in Zimbabwe. Since the March 29
national election, at least 100 people have lost their
lives, 30,000 have been driven from their homes, and
hundreds have sought medical attention because of
political violence. Prior to the June 27 runoff
presidential election, the Mugabe regime also suspended
activities of many NGOs, compounding an already delicate
humanitarian situation. Hyperinflation and a crumbling
economy, fueled by the regime's unwillingness to follow
rudimentary financial protocols and practices, have put
Zimbabwe on the brink of complete collapse. The situation
is complicated by a regional response that has been slow
and ineffective to date in mediating a political solution.
As a precursor to return to the negotiating table,
opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai has stated
unequivocally that he will not negotiate with the Mugabe
regime until the African Union (AU) becomes involved, the
violence ends, and the Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) party officials and supporters are released from
¶11. (SBU) The Ukrainian government has emphasized its
intention for further integration into European and Euro-
Atlantic institutions. Despite significant efforts in
advance of the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Ukraine was not
offered a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), but the
Allies agreed in the Summit Declaration that Ukraine "will
Become" a member of NATO, with Foreign Ministers empowered
to make a decision at the December Ministerial. While MAP
is not a guarantee of membership, this key step will help
solidify democratic gains, civilian accountability and
promote further reform in Ukraine. EU membership remains
a longer term project, however, as several EU member
states have resisted further integration with Kyiv beyond
plans for a free trade agreement and the EU's proposed
"Eastern Partnership." Ukraine's relations with the EU
are currently governed by a Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) in force since 1998. Kyiv sees the
document as outdated and politically insufficient, and
negotiations to replace the PCA began in March 2007. To
date, eight rounds of talks – mainly focusing on a free
trade agreement – have taken place. The most recent talks
on June 2-4 saw the launch of a discussion on the general
principles and framework of a new "enhanced agreement."
The French EU Presidency hopes to finalize this part of
the negotiations by the time of the EU-Ukraine Summit on
September 9 in Evian, France. Energy issues will likely
be a significant component of those discussions.
¶12. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as
possible (in advance of the July 22-23 GAERC).
STATE 00075702 003 OF 005
–We appreciate the EU's June 23 adoption of a list of
additional designations of individuals and entities
associated with Iran's nuclear program for travel bans and
asset freezes. We hope that all EU Member States will
implement these designations rapidly and effectively.
–We look forward to the EU's adoption of UNSCR 1803 into
an EU Common Position in the most robust manner possible.
This could include making mandatory those provisions left
as voluntary in the resolution, such as the calls for
additional vigilance on Iranian banks and inspections on
cargo transported by Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Line. We strongly urge the EU
to act on 1803 at the July 22-23 foreign ministers meeting
–Beyond 1803, we urge the EU to develop a strong package
of autonomous measures to increase the pressure on Iran to
negotiate. Effective steps could include a ban on new
export credits and a ban on new investments in Iran's oil
and gas sector.
–In order to maximize the impact of new EU action and to
build on the momentum created by the June 23 designations,
such autonomous measures would ideally be adopted at the
same time the EU implements 1803. However, if consensus
cannot be reached on this, then we would like the EU to
implement the autonomous measures as soon as possible
after completing the implementation of 1803.
–Pursuing autonomous sanctions and implementing those
mandated by the UNSC is entirely consistent with and
supportive of the P5+1 dual track policy. We hope that
Iran will agree to suspend its proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities, but we must continue to ratchet up the
pressure on Iran until Iran complies with its
–Many states in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere are
looking to the EU for leadership on Iran, and are likely
to follow its lead, either in taking decisive action or in
allowing Iran to continue to stall for time.
–Time is of the essence. Although sanctions take time to
work, they are a critical tool for international pressure;
meanwhile, Iran is advancing in its uranium enrichment and
other sensitive nuclear activities in a bid to present the
international community with a perception of progress –
real or symbolic – that we cannot accept.
–The United States fully supports the June 9 agreement
between the TFG and ARS reached in Djibouti and fully
supports the efforts of the UN SRSG, Ahmedou Ould-
Abdallah, to ensure the full and effective implementation
of this agreement. We continue to encourage all Somali
parties to adhere to the terms of the agreement and to
work together in a process of peaceful dialogue to resume
the transitional process as outlined by the Transitional
–While we continue to support the ongoing political
dialogue process, we urge the European Union (EU) and its
member-states to provide financial support for the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is already
playing a key role on the ground in helping to create the
conditions for lasting peace and stability.
–At the same time, we must begin to quickly move towards
deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia in
response to the request contained in the June 9 agreement
to authorize and deploy an international stabilization
–The United States also remains deeply concerned about
the increasing number of acts of piracy and armed robbery
off the coast of Somalia, and strongly supports regional
efforts to strengthen maritime security.
–Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution
1816, we are seeking confirmation from those countries
STATE 00075702 004 OF 005
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JULY 22-23
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAER
interested in participating in joint interdiction
operations with the multi-national Combined Task Force
(CTF) 150 off the coast of Somalia.
–In addition, we urge all countries, particularly those
with the legal capacity to do so, to commit to take into
custody, investigate, and prosecute, as feasible and
permitted by national laws, persons detained in the course
of interdiction operations, in support of implementation
of UNSCR 1816. Detained persons may include victims,
suspects, or witnesses.
–The United States and the EU must continue to push for
robust implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), particularly resolution of the Abyei boundary
dispute. The recent military confrontation between
northern and southern troops in Abyei, resulting in
extremely dire humanitarian circumstances, underscores the
importance of permanently resolving key areas of impasse
under the CPA.
–Continued U.S. and EU efforts to train and equip troop
contributing countries for their participation in the
UN/African Union hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) are
crucial to that mission's success.
–The Darfur peace process needs robust reinvigoration.
The U.S. and EU must jointly continue support for the
UN/AU led process, including the recent appointment of
Burkinabe Foreign Minister Djibril Bassole as the Joint
Chief Mediator, while pushing for forward movement.
–Both the U.S. and EU need to support the regional
contact group created out of the Dakar Accord and the
African Union's efforts to urge both Chad and Sudan to
repair diplomatic relations immediately and commit to
bringing peace to the region.
–The U.S. and EU should also support the Contact Group's
efforts to establish a security force with a mandate to
secure the border, also laid out in the framework of the
–The crisis in Darfur has extended beyond the borders of
Sudan into Chad, resulting in an estimated 400,000
Sudanese refugees and IDPs living in Chad. Renewed
tensions between Sudan and Chad threaten humanitarian
operations and the success of EUFOR and MINURCAT
–We welcome EU attention to the situation in Zimbabwe and
urge the EU to expand its list of targeted sanctions of
individuals and state-owned enterprises. We urge the EU
to consider listing all of the individuals and entities
subject to the U.S. Zimbabwe sanctions program. The
United States would welcome further information sharing
with the EU on this matter.
–The U.S. draft resolution contains Chapter VII measures,
which would impose a comprehensive arms embargo as well as
an asset freeze and travel ban on those designated as
having engaged in or provided support for actions or
policies to undermine democratic processes or institutions
in Zimbabwe, including having ordered, planned, or
participated in acts of politically motivated violence.
–We need your support for getting the AU, UN, and members
of SADC, especially Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South
Africa, to help to mediate negotiations between Mugabe and
MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai.
–We should work together to promote government stability
in Ukraine and stress the need to put the good of the
country above individual interests. We encourage the EU
to recognize Ukraine's westward orientation and to remain
open to cooperation and partnership whenever possible.
Signaling to Ukraine that membership is possible upon
fulfillment of proper conditions would reinforce and
STATE 00075702 005 OF 005
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JULY 22-23
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAER
accelerate political and economic reform. Conversely, a
closed door would likely have a negative effect on
Ukraine's development and its westward orientation.
–We welcome Ukraine's continued work with the EU, and we
look forward to coordinating with Brussels on actions to
advance economic reforms and promote domestic stability.
In particular, we hope to work in tandem with the EU to
encourage greater attention to battling corruption,
promoting transparency, and improving the investment
climate in Ukraine.
–We also look forward to working with the EU on
developing a trilateral energy dialogue with Ukraine that
promotes greater transparency, efficiency, diversification
of energy sources and routes, the elimination of
middlemen, and market principles.
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