Former army commander Solomon Mujuru found Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai more acceptable than Emmerson Mnangagwa his main rival within the Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front, according to a cable released by Wikileaks.
This was said by Tsvangirai when he briefed diplomats about the possible signing of a memorandum of understanding between his party, the smaller faction of the MDC and ZANU-PF which would pave way for talks.
He said the leader of the smaller faction of the MDC Arthur Mutambara, President Robert Mugabe and himself were expected to sign the MOU by 16 July.
Mujuru appeared to want a quick solution to the Zimbabwe crisis because he wanted his assets to be unfrozen. He had reportedly told United States embassy officials that the US had frozen US$7 million of his money.
Tsvangirai said that there were three possible outcomes to the negotiations:
- A coalition government led by ZANU-PF;
- A power-sharing government based on the Kenyan model;
- and a transition government led by the MDC.
He was firm that only the third outcome would be acceptable to the MDC but noted that this might well include a role for Mugabe, and asked understanding from the international community should that come to pass.
Viewing cable 08HARARE607, ZANU-PF–MDC PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS
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SUBJECT: ZANU-PF–MDC PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS
REF: HARARE 605
Classified By: CDA Khatherine Dhanani for reason 1.4 (d)
¶1. (C) MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai briefed diplomats
from the U.S., UK, Sweden, and Australia July 12 on the
ZANU-PF–MDC negotiation process. He said representatives
from his faction (MDC-T), the MDC Mutambara faction (MDC-M)
and ZANU-PF had concluded a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for
negotiations. He anticipated the MOA would be signed by
himself GOZ president Robert Mugabe and MDC-M leader Arthur
Mutambara on July 16 with negotiations to begin a week later.
Tsvangirai was emphatic that he would not accept an ultimate
agreement that did not leave the MDC in control of
government, but acknowledged that a best-achievable scenario
might leave Mugabe as part of the government. Tsvangirai
also expressed appreciation for efforts to pass the UN
sanction resolution and said the most effective sanctions
effort now would be to target children of sanctioned
individuals. END SUMMARY.
Memorandum of Agreement and Negotiations
¶2. (C) Tsvangirai said the MOA was intended to define a
framework for negotiations between ZANU-PF and the two MDC
factions. Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma represented MDC-T,
Welshman Ncube and Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga
represented MDC-M, and Patrick Chinamasa and Nicholas Goche
represented ZANU-PF. Talks occurred on July 10 and July 11.
¶3. (C) Tsvagirai expected the African Union to appoint a
mediator to work with South African president Thabo Mbeki,
although South Africa was taking the position that it should
be the sole mediator. Names that had been mentioned included
former UN secretary-general Bhutros Bhutros Ghali, former
Tanzanian presidents Joseph Warioba and Benjamin Mpaka, and
South African businessman and ANC heavyweight Cyril
Rhamaposa. Tsvangirai was confident someone–not necessarily
those mentioned–would be identified and that South Africa
would accept a co-mediation role.
¶4. (C) Tsvangirai stated that Mugabe’s role in the mediation
would have to be agreed upon. The MDC, according to
Tsvangirai, would recognize Mugabe as the head of ZANU-PF,
one of the parties to the negotiation, but would not
recognize him as head of government. Additionally, one of
the pre-conditions to negotiations was an end to violence,
and a mechanism for monitoring violence would have to be
¶5. (C) The South African-drafted MOA would be presented to
the parties on July 14, according to Tsvangirai. Mugabe,
Tsvangirai, and Mutambara would then sign it on July 16.
Negotiations would begin one week later. Tsvangirai stated
that ZANU-PF wanted to conclude the negotiations within two
weeks; the MDC thought a month was a more reasonable period.
Tsvangirai noted that he expected to have a one-on-one
meeting with Mugabe before the MOA was signed.
¶6. (C) Tsvangirai opined that there were three possible
outcomes to the negotiations: 1) a coalition government led
by ZANU-PF; 2) a power-sharing government based on the Kenyan
model; and 3) a transition government led by the MDC. He was
firm that only the third outcome would be acceptable to the
MDC. He noted that this might well include a role for
Mugabe, and asked understanding from the international
HARARE 00000607 002 OF 002
community should that come to pass.
¶7. (C) South Africa, according to Tsvangirai, was amenable
to an MDC-led transitional government. General Solomon
Mujuru would also willingly accept such an outcome. Mujuru
found Tsvangirai and the MDC more acceptable than Emmerson
Mnangagwa; also, Mujuru was looking for a way out of the
current crisis that would result in an unfreezing of his
assets. (NOTE: Mujuru previously told us that the U.S. had
frozen $7 million of his money. END NOTE.) Despite
acceptance of MDC leadership by South Africa and Mujuru,
Tsvangirai, recalling past ZANU-PF perfidy, cautioned against
getting hopes up.
A Note on the UN Resolution
¶8. (C) Tsvangirai expressed appreciation for efforts to pass
the UN sanctions resolution. He believed that, more than
additional sanctions, ZANU-PF heavyweights were worried about
ending up at The Hague. Passage of the resolution would have
been a step in that direction and useful in exerting more
pressure on the regime. At this point, to exert more
pressure, he suggested targeted sanctions against the
children of sanctioned individuals to prevent them from
traveling to and studying in the U.S., UK, and Australia.
¶9. (C) ZANU-PF is a fractured party and there are those like
the Mujurus who would like to see the end of a Mugabe-led
government. Having observed what ZANU-PF was willing to put
Zimbabwe through in the last several months in order to
maintain power, we find it difficult to believe, however,
that the party will willingly cede power to Tsvangirai. We
need to make clear to all parties that the USG will accept
only an MDC-led government and that reengagement is dependent
upon actions as defined by our principles–concrete steps
toward political and economic reform. A ZANU-PF–MDC
agreement by itself is not enough.