Although United States embassy officials in Pretoria did not believe that the election of Jacob Zuma as President of the African National Congress would see an immediate change in South Africa’s foreign policy, Idasa analyst Sydney Masamvu believed that Zuma would be “more robust” in his criticism of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe.
Masamvu said this was likely to be the case because Zuma’s allies in COSATU and SACP were openly sympathetic to the opposition in Zimbabwe.
He said Zuma would also be more sensitive to the growing domestic resentment of Zimbabwean immigrants, estimated at between one and three million, as they were perceived to be taking jobs and housing away from poor South Africans.
According to a cable released by Wikileaks, embassy officials said Zuma had already exhibited a firm grasp of Zimbabwean politics, noting that Mugabe’s seizure of white farms had nothing to do with land reform.
He had also criticised African leaders for staying in office too long, which the officials thought was a likely reference to both Mugabe and South African President Thabo Mbeki.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 07PRETORIA4218, NO IMMEDIATE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO5024
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHSA #4218/01 3521954
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181954Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2989
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 9440
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 5156
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRETORIA 004218
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR P, AF, AF/S, S/P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM ZI SF
SUBJECT: NO IMMEDIATE CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN
POLICY UNDER ZUMA
REF: A. 05 PRETORIA 2383
¶B. PRETORIA 1598
¶C. PRETORIA 4217
PRETORIA 00004218 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Chief of Mission Eric M. Bost. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The election of Jacob Zuma as African
National Congress (ANC) President (Ref C) will not result in
any immediate changes in South Africa’s foreign policy.
Should Zuma become national president following parliamentary
elections in early 2009 — not a foregone conclusion with
corruption charges hanging over him — we would expect the
South African Government (SAG) to focus more on domestic
issues and less on foreign policy. Zuma would not
micromanage foreign policy, as Mbeki has done, and would rely
more on his Foreign Minister and team, which remain unknown
at this time. Key strands of Mbeki’s approach would likely
continue, such as the focus on Africa and South-South
cooperation, but Zuma’s foreign policy would probably be less
ideological, more pragmatic, and less inclined toward
complicated intellectual debates and grand initiatives. Some
analysts believe that Zuma, a more typically “African” leader
than the British-educated Mbeki, could be more effective in
building ties with other regional leaders and promoting South
Africa’s agenda in Africa. While Zuma’s pragmatism could
result in improved U.S.-South African relations, many of his
key advisors come from the far left of South Africa’s
political spectrum and are suspicious of the United States.
Analysts believe Zuma’s poor judgment in his personal and
professional life raises questions about his leadership
skills and effectiveness in promoting South Africa’s future
foreign policy agenda. END SUMMARY.
——————————
Mbeki Still National President
——————————
¶2. (C) Despite Jacob Zuma’s election as ANC President, Thabo
Mbeki will remain South Africa’s national President until
early 2009 when parliamentary elections are due to be held,
and thus will continue to drive the country’s foreign policy
for the remainder of South Africa’s UN Security Council
tenure. (NOTE: The national President is elected by
parliament, which can only remove him/her via a no-confidence
vote or for misconduct, violating the law, or inability to
perform the functions of office. The only other way to force
an early Mbeki departure would be early parliamentary
elections, called by a majority of the National Assembly. We
believe this is unlikely, and Zuma allies have stated that
they will not try to remove Mbeki. END NOTE.)
¶3. (C) As ANC President, Jacob Zuma will have some influence
on major foreign policy issues in 2008, but day-to-day
decisions will remain in Mbeki’s hands and those of his key
advisors. The ANC sets broad policy guidelines for
government, but generally does not tie the hands of the
executive in its implementation. South Africa’s current
foreign policy strategy, set by the ANC National Executive
Committee, will continue to guide Mbeki, as well as the
future president. The policy resolutions under debate in
Polokwane following ANC elections deal almost entirely with
domestic issues, evidence that South Africa’s foreign policy
remains generally non-controversial among ANC members.
¶4. (C) Zuma’s election as ANC president does not/not mean
Q4. (C) Zuma’s election as ANC president does not/not mean
that he is assured of becoming national president in 2009.
Zuma was charged in 2005 with corruption and fraud in
connection with an arms deal (ref A). Although the case was
dropped from the court rolls in August 2007 pending
resolution of related appeals, prosecutors have a strong case
and could charge Zuma again once the Constitutional Court has
decided the last remaining appeal. If Zuma is convicted, he
has said he would step down as ANC President. (NOTE: The
South African Constitution prohibits anyone convicted of a
serious crime from becoming a member of parliament, and thus
the party candidate for President. END NOTE.)
—————–
Zuma Team Unclear
—————–
PRETORIA 00004218 002.2 OF 004
¶5. (C) Should Zuma become national president, he would be
less likely to micromanage foreign policy than President
Mbeki has done, and would rely more on advisors, according to
head of the Brenthurst Foundation Greg Mills. Mills
speculated that Zuma might chose an “Mbeki-ite,” such as
current Minister for Provincial and Local Government Sydney
Mufamadi as Foreign Minister, as an olive branch to the Mbeki
camp. Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)
Director Ivor Jenkins said that Zuma understands that foreign
policy and finance are two of his weakest points and will
strive, at least initially, for continuity in these areas.
Zuma might even keep current ForMin (and ex-wife) Nkosazana
Dlamini-Zuma to reassure the Mbeki wing of the ANC and the
international community.
¶6. (C) Zuma’s current crop of senior advisors, such as COSATU
Secretary General Zwelinzima Vavi and South African Communist
SIPDIS
Party (SACP) head Blade Nzimande, include few foreign policy
experts. Newly-elected ANC Deputy President Motlanthe would
likely be a key voice on international issues, particularly
if he assumes the Deputy Presidency of the country. Mo
Shaik, former head of the Department of Foreign Affairs Unit
for Policy, Research and Analysis, Ambassador to Algeria, ANC
intelligence operative, and a brother of imprisoned fraudster
Schabir Shaik, is a close Zuma ally and would have influence
on international issues. Others mentioned by Embassy
contacts as possible foreign policy advisors in a Zuma
administration include: former chief of the South African
National Defence Force Siphiwe Nyanda; South African
Ambassador to Washington Welile Nhlapo; KwaZulu-Natal MEC for
Finance and Economic Development Zweli Mkhize; former Zuma
political advisor Ebrahim Ebrahim; and SAG Great Lakes Envoy
Kingsley Mamabolo.
——————————-
More Focused on Domestic Issues
——————————-
¶7. (C) Should Zuma become national president, he would likely
focus his energies, at least initially, on domestic issues,
according to Mills, Jenkins, and South African Institute for
International Affairs (SAIIA) head Elizabeth Sidiropolous.
Zuma owes his election, at least in part, to the trade
unions, who expect him to deal first with issues of poverty,
HIV and AIDS, income inequality, unemployment, and service
delivery. Mills believes that the Mbeki era may represent
the peak of South Africa’s activity on foreign policy,
although perhaps not its effectiveness. Mbeki has a profound
personal interest in foreign policy and spent most of his
life in exile. Mbeki was schooled in the philosophy that
South Africa’s future was deeply intertwined with the future
of the world, and that broader international forces held the
key to South Africa’s development. Zuma is much more a
creature of internal politics and struggles, and is less
convinced of the importance of global institutions and power
dynamics to the country’s future.
————————————-
Less Dogmatic on Multilateral Issues?
————————————-
¶8. (C) Zuma’s multilateral diplomacy would be more pragmatic
and straightforward, Mills suggested. Zuma would not
“over-intellectualize” issues, like South Africa’s vote
Q”over-intellectualize” issues, like South Africa’s vote
against the Burma resolution in the UNSC on “jurisdictional”
grounds or more recent opposition to the U.S.-sponsored UN
resolution on rape. In this sense, Mills believes that Zuma
would be more straightforward and transparent, without the
“liberation politics paranoia,” and, thus, easier to deal
with. Advisor Mo Shaik told PolOff that South Africa under
Zuma “will talk less, and listen more,” and stop trying to
tell every country how to solve its conflicts using the South
African model.
¶9. (C) Certain elements of Mbeki’s foreign policy would
continue, particularly South-South cooperation, Sidiropolous
said. Zuma would continue to have close ties with countries
such as Cuba that supported the ANC during the anti-apartheid
struggle and would strongly support the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) and G-77. South Africa would continue to side with the
Africa bloc in multilateral fora, although perhaps would be
PRETORIA 00004218 003.2 OF 004
more sensitive to its perceived role as “big brother” on the
continent. On international economic issues, SAIIA’s
Sidiropolous suggested that there is a danger that Zuma might
become more protectionist due to pressure from the trade
unions, leading the SAG to become an even less helpful player
in multilateral trade talks.
——————–
Continuity in Africa
——————–
¶10. (C) Zuma would likely continue South Africa’s intensive
engagement in Africa, particularly on conflict resolution and
post-conflict reconstruction. Even a domestic-focused
administration would view peace and stability in Africa as
important to South Africa’s future. Mbeki’s “grand
initiatives,” like the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) and the “African Renaissance,” would
largely fade away under Zuma, according to Mills. (NOTE:
Mills believes that NEPAD is already irrelevant, noting that
he has spent three months traveling around Africa and not
once did NEPAD come up; only Mbeki and donors talk about
NEPAD. END NOTE.)
¶11. (C) Zuma has some policy experience in Africa. Most
prominently, he served as regional mediator in Burundi from
2002-2005, and by most accounts did a good job. According to
Henri Boshoff, Great Lakes expert at the Institute for
Security Studies (ISS), Zuma was a patient and effective
mediator, listening to all sides and gently nudging the
parties toward an agreement. IDASA’s Jenkins also noted that
Zuma, who comes from rural KwaZulu-Natal and has at least
three wives, is a more typically African leader than the
British-educated, elitist Mbeki, and may in fact be more
effective in promoting South Africa’s agenda in Africa.
(COMMENT: Despite Mbeki’s reputation as peacemaker, one
could argue that Burundi is the SAG’s most obvious conflict
resolution success, and that Zuma — not Mbeki — deserves
most of the credit. Mbeki’s mediations in Cote d’Ivoire and
Zimbabwe to date have not been successful, and South Africa
was one of many players in the DRC peace talks. END COMMENT.)
¶12. (C) On Zimbabwe, there are signs that Zuma would be more
publicly critical of President Robert Mugabe and would end
South Africa’s policy of “quiet diplomacy.” At a 10 December
2007 speech at the University of Witwatersrand on Human
Rights Day, Zuma criticized “world leaders” (read: Mbeki) for
standing by and watching “the deterioration of nations”
(read: Zimbabwe). IDASA’s Sydney Masamvu believes that Zuma
would be “more robust” in his criticism of Mugabe’s policies.
Zuma’s allies in COSATU and SACP are openly sympathetic to
the opposition in Zimbabwe, Masamvu noted, and Zuma would
also be more sensitive to the growing domestic resentment of
Zimbabwean immigrants (estimated between one and three
million) who are perceived to be taking jobs and housing away
from poor South Africans. In a May 2, 2007, meeting with
then-Charge (ref B), Zuma exhibited a firm grasp of
Zimbabwean politics, noting that Mugabe’s seizure of white
farms had nothing to do with land reform. Zuma criticized
African leaders for staying in office too long, a likely
reference to both Mugabe and Mbeki.
—————————–
Improved Bilateral Relations?
—————————–
¶13. (C) It is too soon to tell whether a Zuma presidency
Q13. (C) It is too soon to tell whether a Zuma presidency
would affect significantly U.S.-South African relations.
Much depends on whom he would select for his foreign policy
team and how Mbeki and Zuma navigate the transition ahead.
We agree with the think tank analysts that Zuma would likely
be more pragmatic than Mbeki, would not
“over-intellectualize” issues, and would be less inclined to
involve South Africa in disputes where it has minimal
national interest (like the Middle East). Zuma likely would
be more straightforward in his policymaking, making him
somewhat easier to work with than Mbeki. Zuma’s style is
more open and consensual, and could result in enhanced access
to senior policymakers. This may create opportunities for
new initiatives and closer cooperation on key issues.
PRETORIA 00004218 004.2 OF 004
¶14. (C) Zuma’s openness and pragmatism make him susceptible
to lobbying from the full range of international actors. On
any given issue, this could result in positions sympathetic
or contrary to U.S. interests. For example, Zuma might not
vote against a UNSC Burma resolution on technical or
legalistic grounds, but an interested regional power could
still negotiate a “no” vote via a “pragmatic” backroom deal.
¶15. (C) SAIIA’s Sidiropolous and other analysts raise the
valid concern that Zuma has exhibited poor judgment in his
personal and professional life, most recently in connection
with corruption and rape allegations. He sometimes makes
bizarre public statements, such as claiming that showering
prevents the spread of HIV, and he lacks formal education.
Many of Zuma’s closet allies come from the far left of South
African politics, and are deeply suspicious of the United
States. All these elements raise questions about Zuma’s
ability to make consistently thoughtful decisions and his
commitment to promoting good governance and economic reform
in Africa, hallmarks of Mbeki’s Africa policy. They also add
a degree of unpredictability to the future direction of South
Africa’s foreign policy should Zuma succeed in winning the
national presidency in 2009.
BOST
(23 VIEWS)
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