The European Union renewed its sanctions on Zimbabwe, one year after the formation of the inclusive government, because of the lack of progress in the implementation of the Global Political Agreement entered into by the three major political parties in Zimbabwe in 2008.
It, however, lifted sanctions on six individuals and nine entities.
The United States had warned the EU that lifting sanctions could undermine “our common political front and diminish EU leverage vis-a-vis Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwean regime”.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 10BRUSSELS197, EU REVISES ZIMBABWE SANCTIONS
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VZCZCXRO0227
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0197/01 0501337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191337Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000197
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR IO, EEB, S/CT, EUR/ERA, AF, EAP, L
TREASURY FOR TFI, IA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS: ETTC KTFN BEXP KJUS EWWT EAIR PTER EFIN EUN
PINR, ZI
SUBJECT: EU REVISES ZIMBABWE SANCTIONS
Classified By: USEU EconMinCouns Peter Chase for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C//NF) SUMMARY. The EU formally agreed on February 15
to extend its sanctions against Zimbabwe by twelve months.
Changes include the de-listing of six individuals and nine
entities; the EU otherwise rolled over all existing program
measures. Preambulatory paragraphs within the Council
Decision helpfully note that sanctions remain appropriate and
should be extended, due to the lack of progress in
implementation of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement. But
these also state that “there are no longer grounds” for
maintaining certain listings, which may prove detrimental to
U.S. designations of the relevant individuals and entities or
to transatlantic political messaging concerning Zimbabwe.
Brussels-based contacts say that the action came after
intense debate and compromise; some Member States (notably
Belgium, see below) pushed strongly for a more limited
six-month rollover. Concerning de-listings, contacts are
adamant that signs of dynamism in the EU program will
encourage and empower the MDC. USG officials cautioned in
advance of the EU decision that the de-listings could
undermine our common political front and diminish EU leverage
vis-a-vis Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwean regime (SEPTEL).
Separately, the EU extended for another year its suspension
of budgetary support to the GoZ under Article 96 of the
Cotonou Agreement. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) During the February 15 Education, Youth and Culture
Council formation meeting, the European Union formally agreed
to extend its sanctions against Zimbabwe by twelve (12)
months. Revisions to the EU program, which were adopted
without debate, may be found in Council Decision
2010/92/CFSP. The EU de-listed six (6) individuals and nine
(9) entities, but otherwise rolled over all existing program
measures. The individuals include one (1) who has left the
GoZ, four (4) who are now deceased, and one (1), Thamer Al
Shanfari, whom the EU assesses no longer meets designation
criteria. Eight (8) of the entities are Zimbabwean
parastatals that were designated by the EU on January 27,
2009, but which have been judged, based on reporting from EU
Member State missions in Harare, to be under control of the
Zimbabwean finance ministry and thus de-linked from ZANU-PF.
¶3. (C//NF) Brussels-based contacts (UK, Spain as current EU
Presidency, EU Council Secretariat) say that the action came
after intense debate and compromise. Our interlocutors were
unwilling to revisit de-listing decisions once the necessary
compromises were struck within the Council’s COAFR regional
working group (late January). They were also adamant that
select de-listings were appropriate and that signs of
dynamism in the EU program would encourage and empower the
MDC. A U.S. delegation visiting Brussels to discuss
sanctions issues (SEPTEL) informed EU institutional and
Member State contacts that parastatal designations were
assessed by the USG to be a significant leverage point
vis-a-vis Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF, and cautioned that the
de-listing of these entities would most likely diminish EU
leverage with respect to the Zimbabwean regime.
¶4. (C//NF) Some Member States pushed strongly for a more
limited six-month rollover. The UK and Council Secretariat
seem especially content that EU measures will be extended by
a full year. USEU notes that a six-month rollover would have
placed Zimbabwe sanctions on the Council’s agenda during
Belgium’s stewardship of the rotating EU Presidency. The
Belgian External Relations (“RELEX”) sanctions
representative, who will presumably chair the RELEX sanctions
working group during his country’s July-December 2010 EU
Presidency, reportedly frequently complicates life for the
UK, in particular on Zimbabwe issues, even using a technical
pretext to delay this specific rollover for as long as
possible. Contacts note that this individual has behaved in
a rogue manner at times in EU working group meetings,
sometimes contradicting his explicit instructions from the
Belgian Foreign Ministry.
¶5. (C//NF) The visiting U.S. delegation raised the
BRUSSELS 00000197 002 OF 002
importance of messaging with the UK, Spain, and Council
Secretariat. U.S. officials indicated that the USG would not
be easing our Zimbabwe sanctions and shared our desire to
maintain a common transatlantic political front. The Spanish
Presidency and the Council Secretariat reviewed draft text
for the conclusions that now accompany the new Common
Position. U.S. officials noted several points of concern,
and our contacts agreed to remove language that would
undermine USG political messaging. Their finalized
conclusions are largely neutral, stating simply that
sanctions were extended before listing measures that the
program currently includes.
¶6. (C) However, there are two preambulatory paragraphs with
political implications within the body of Council Decision
2010/92/CFSP. The first helpfully notes the lack of progress
in implementation of the Global Political Agreement. The
second treats de-listings as a group and in generic terms,
stating that “there are no longer grounds” for maintaining
certain listings. (COMMENT: This may prove detrimental to
U.S. designations of the relevant individuals and entities.
END COMMENT.)
¶7. (C//NF) During a February 2 bilateral meeting with the UK
(SEPTEL), the U.S. delegation also asked if the EU would
consider creating a system of temporary licensing of
transactions with designated entities as an alternative to
the relatively permanent de-listing action. The UK said that
there was no appetite within the EU for a licensing regime,
which finance ministries find overly burdensome.
¶8. (U) Separately, the EU Council also extended for another
year measures first taken in 2002 against the Government of
Zimbabwe under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. These
measures include the suspension of budgetary support and
projects, but do not affect humanitarian and social
operations, or projects benefiting the implementation of the
GPA. The EU considers that these measures can only be fully
revoked once the GPA is effectively put into practice by the
Zimbabwean authorities.
MURRAY
(49 VIEWS)
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