Movement for Democratic Change spokesman Nelson Chamisa told United States embassy officials that the United States rhetoric that “Mugabe must go” was empty and counterproductive.
He said regime opponents had initially hoped that the rhetoric would be complemented by action instead US inaction was causing people to lose heart.
ZANU-PF was using US statements as a pretext to crack down on the MDC and civil society, both of which it was accusing of collaborating with the US to bring about regime change.
Asked what concrete actions the US and international community could take, Chamisa responded:
- military intervention to remove the regime,
- indictments of Mugabe and other ZANU-PF officials in international courts,
- and sanctioning of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09HARARE38, MDC SPOKESMAN CHAMISA ON MDC POSITION, U.S. POLICY
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO6521
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0038/01 0141231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141231Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3918
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2544
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2666
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1159
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1935
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2290
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2715
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 5143
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1826
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000038
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2019
SUBJECT: MDC SPOKESMAN CHAMISA ON MDC POSITION, U.S. POLICY
REF: A. HARARE 06
¶B. PRETORIA 43
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) MDC spokesman Nelson Chamisa told polecon chief on
January 14 that the MDC was resolved to condition entry into
government on satisfactory resolution of outstanding issues.
MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai would meet with Zimbabwean
president Mugabe in the next few days to either resolve these
issues or tell Mugabe to form a government without the MDC.
Chamisa also opined that U.S. rhetoric on Mugabe was empty
and counterproductive. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Chamisa said that the MDC at its strategy meeting in
South Africa had affirmed the position of its National
Council to enter a transitional government of national unity
only if outstanding issues were resolved (Ref A). He said
that a meeting between Zimbabwean president Mugabe and MDC
leader Tsvangirai was tentatively scheduled for January 16,
although it could slip until next week depending on
scheduling conflicts. South African president Motlanthe
would preside over the meeting; mediator Thabo Mbeki would
likely also attend. Tsvangirai, according to Chamisa, would
use the meeting to present the MDC demands on outstanding
issues. If Mugabe failed to make concessions, Tsvangirai
would tell him he should form a government without the MDC.
¶3. (C) Chamisa said the MDC strategy was to put the ball in
ZANU-PF’s court by putting forth the MDC position for ZANU-PF
to accept or reject. Negotiations and talks about
negotiations had gone on too long, and it was time for a
decision as to whether or not there would be a government of
national unity. The MDC, according to Chamisa, doubted
Mugabe would agree to share governorships and reallocate
ministries. To concede half the governorships to the MDC,
which would involve removing five of the 10 newly-appointed
governors, would be viewed by ZANU-PF membership as a sign of
weakness. Perhaps more importantly, governors were important
to ZANU-PF electoral organizational efforts and party
patronage in their provinces, and ZANU-PF would lose this
advantage if some of its governors were replaced by MDC
members. As to ministries, Chamisa was doubtful that ZANU-PF
would agree to a reallocation that would weaken its position
in government.
¶4. (C) Assuming the collapse of the September 15 inter-party
agreement, Chamisa told us the MDC would pursue a
multi-faceted strategy of public and diplomatic outreach and,
in collaboration with civil society, mass mobilization. We
asked why such a strategy could now be successful when it had
failed in the past. Chamisa responded that the MDC had
learned from its many mistakes which would aid it in going
forward with new strategies.
¶5. (C) Turning to U.S. policy, Chamisa said rhetoric that
“Mugabe must go” was empty and counterproductive. Regime
opponents initially hoped that the rhetoric would be
complemented by action. Inaction on the part of the U.S. was
causing people to lose heart. Further, ZANU-PF was using
U.S. statements as a pretext to crack down on the MDC and
civil society, both of which it was accusing of collaborating
with the U.S. to bring about regime change. We asked Chamisa
what concrete actions the U.S. and international community
could take. He responded: military intervention to remove
the regime, indictments of Mugabe and other ZANU-PF officials
in international courts, and sanctioning of the Reserve Bank
HARARE 00000038 002 OF 002
of Zimbabwe.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶6. (C) While there are some in the MDC who would like to
enter into government with ZANU-PF and some who do not want
to be part of a government of national unity under any
circumstances, the position of the MDC appears clear: it
will enter into a power-sharing government –with or without
Mugabe– only if outstanding issues are resolved on MDC
terms. A Mugabe-Tsvangirai meeting, if it takes place, will
be critical in determining whether the differences between
the parties can be bridged. We agree with Chamisa that it is
unlikely ZANU-PF will make the concessions the MDC is
demanding. Regardless, there may be an end to the on-going
SADC-sponsored process within the next couple of weeks. END
COMMENT.
MCGEE
(20 VIEWS)
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