Nathan Shamuyarira, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front spokesman and close ally of President Robert Mugabe, told United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Joseph Sullivan way back in 2003 that Mugabe was ready to retire any time even before the end of his term but he wanted a dignified exit.
He said the only way forward for Zimbabwe was for the Movement for Democratic Change to withdraw its legal challenge of the 2002 election result and acknowledge the legitimacy of the government.
“Once they take that step,” Shamuyarira said “we can work with them.”
When asked if Mugabe was willing to retire before the expiration of his term of office in 2008, Sullivan said Shamuyarira said without hesitation that Mugabe was willing to leave office but only in a “blaze of glory”, not a “blaze of condemnation”.
Mugabe was prepared to leave if the exit were dignified; otherwise, he would stay put.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 03HARARE767, MUGABE READY TO LEAVE, WITH CONDITIONS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000767
SIPDIS
LONDON FOR CGURNEY
PARIS FOR CNEARY
NAIROBI FOR TPFLAUMER
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2013
SUBJECT: MUGABE READY TO LEAVE, WITH CONDITIONS
Classified By: political section chief Matt Harrington. Reasons: 1.5 (
B) and (D).
Summary
——–
¶1. (C) In an April 16 conversation with the Ambassador,
ZANU-PF spokesman and elder statesman Nathan Shamuyarira
seemed concerned about the implications of USG actions in
Iraq for Zimbabwe. He deemed a U.S. or British invasion
“unlikely,” but thought attempts would be made to destabilize
the country using the opposition Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC). Shamuyarira insisted that Robert Mugabe is
prepared to step down if the MDC withdraws its legal
challenge of the 2002 presidential election and accepts the
legitimacy of his presidency. End Summary.
Is Zimbabwe on post-Iraq list?
—————————–
¶2. (C) In an April 16 conversation with the Ambassador,
ZANU-PF spokesman and elder statesman Nathan Shamuyarira
expressed concern about a recent statement by a Pentagon
spokesman that dictators around the world should take note of
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Shamuyarira said there is
apprehension in some quarters that the United States will not
stop with Iraq, and he said Zimbabwe has to be concerned it
might be on the target list. The Ambassador noted Secretary
Powell’s comments of April 15 that the United States had not
drawn up any list of countries to be invaded. We do have
concerns about many developments in Zimbabwe but prefer to
resolve these through dialogue.
¶3. (C) Shamuyarira mused that a U.S. or British invasion of
Zimabwe is unlikely, but he said ZANU-PF expects the British
government to try to destabilize the country via the
opposition MDC. Shamuyarira claimed to have seen evidence of
a growing willingness on the part of the MDC to use violence.
He said the opposition party had bombed ZANU-PF offices in
Chinhoyi, had tried unsuccessfully to blow up a bridge in
Kadoma during the mid-March stayaway, and had placed spikes
in the middle of roads to prevent people from getting to
work. Shamuyarira thought the MDC had gained confidence in
their capacity to elicit political change, not because they
had the support of Zimbabweans but because they were
acquiring “military capabilities.” ZANU-PF, he said, has the
capacity to stop these sorts of activities but cautioned that
this might cause bloodshed. “Things could get pretty rough
here,” Shamuyarira warned.
Recognize Mugabe’s legitimacy
—————————–
¶4. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that violence from any
quarter would not solve Zimbabwe’s problems, and he expressed
his hope that all parties would avoid resorting to it. The
solution to Zimbabwe’s difficulties, Shamuyarira retorted, is
very simple. The MDC and the British government must accept
the outcome of the 2002 presidential election; then the
ruling party would be prepared to bring the MDC into
government. The Ambassador pointed out that the United
States Government did not consider that election to have been
free and fair. A number of organizations had conducted
extensive observations of the election process and found
numerous and serious electoral irregularities, including
widespread violence against opposition supporters, unbalanced
access to the media, and the provision of voters rolls only
to the ruling party. The United States made clear to the GOZ
prior to the election that a refusal to address and correct
these problems would have a detrimental impact on our
bilateral relationship. The Government of Zimbabwe, however,
had continued on the same path, and the result was a process
which could not be considered free and fair.
¶5. (C) Shamuyarira dismissed the Ambassador’s assessment as
a “subjective, partisan view meant to support the MDC” and
one “not based on an objective analysis of reality.” The MDC
won the Harare mayoral election, recent parliamentary
by-elections in Kuwadzana and Highfield, and 57 parliamentary
seats in 2000. The ruling party, he insisted, conducts
elections better than any country on the continent, except
South Africa. The bottom line, he said, is that “if people
don’t want Mugabe and ZANU-PF, they’ll say what they want.”
The Ambassador reiterated that the USG had expressed its
concerns well in advance of the voting days themselves,
noting that the first phase of our targeted sanctions was
announced in February 2002, several weeks before the
election.
Way Forward
———–
¶6. (C) The only way forward for Zimbabwe, Shamuyarira
stressed, was for the MDC to withdraw its legal challenge of
the election result and acknowledge the legitimacy of the
Government. Once they take that step, “we can work with
them.” The Ambassador asked whether Mugabe would be willing
to retire before expiration of his term in 2008, and whether
his early departure would create opportunities for political
dialogue. Without hesitation, Shamuyarira said Mugabe is
willing to leave office but only in a “blaze of glory,” not a
“blaze of condemnation.” He would be prepared to leave if
the exit were dignified; otherwise, he would stay put. The
often-made accusation that Mugabe is clinging to power is
simply untrue, Shamuyarira claimed. ZANU-PF, he continued,
had agreed in 1999 to hold a special party congress in 2000
to discuss presidential succession, but other developments
intervened.
¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the MDC’s withdrawal of
its court challenge and recognition of Mugabe’s legitimacy
for a limited period, in exchange for an early retirement by
the Zimbabean president, could form the basis of a political
agreement. Yes, Shamuyarira replied, if the MDC withdraws
its election challenge and accepts the Government’s
legitimacy, Mugabe would be ready to go. The Ambassador
welcomed Shamuyarira’s assurance on that point, stressing
that an early retirement by Mugabe could help Zimbabwe avoid
the collision course it appeared to be on. Shamuyarira said
Mugabe could not retire under UK condemnation. The
Ambassador suggested that Mugabe’s resignation in order to
resolve a crisis could be recognized as a “statesmanlike”
gesture. We believed that, subsequent to the retirement, the
legitimacy question would have to be resolved definitively
through the holding of elections recognized as free and fair
by both sides, in contrast to the non-transparent elections
held in 2002. If there is international recognition that the
election process was fair and transparent, there would be
pressure on the losing party to accept the result. The
Ambassador added that the United States would accept the
outcome of an election that conformed to SADC’s electoral
norms and standards.
Land
—-
¶8. (C) Shamuyarira freely acknowledged the problems in the
Government’s land redistribution program. Many senior
figures, including Ministers, had “cashed in” on this
program, and a high-level “acquisitions committee” headed by
Vice-President Msika had been formed to clean up the mess.
The real problem with the land issue, in Shamuyarira’s view,
was the strong support given by commercial farmers to the
MDC. That support had piqued Mugabe’s anger and had soured
relations between the commercial farmers and the GOZ.
Comment
——-
¶9. (C) In his mid-70’s and a senior member of the ruling
party politburo, Shamuyarira is Mugabe’s contemporary and
enjoys considerable access to the Zimbabwean President. This
is the first time we have heard from someone who enjoys such
a close personal relationship with Mugabe that Mugabe is
prepared to leave office. Subsequent to this conversation,
we learned that Shamuyarira, probably acting at Mugabe’s
behest, had earlier sent an emissary to MDC President Morgan
Tsvangirai’s special advisor exploring the possibility of
SIPDIS
dialogue and stressing Mugabe’s willingness to retire early
under the right conditions. The director of the Central
Intelligence Organization — Happyton Bonyongwe — also sent
an emissary to the MDC on April 16 carrying a similar
message.
¶10. (C) MDC leaders have previously indicated their
willingness to withdraw the court challenge in exchange for
genuine dialogue with the GOZ and real progress toward
resolving Zimbabwe’s interlocking crises. We believe a
dignified exit is an ironclad precondition for a willing
departure by Mugabe, although it is unclear what elements
would comprise such an exit. At any rate, Shamuyarira’s
remarks to us and the two recent overtures to the MDC suggest
a positive inclination toward dialogue that we ought to
encourage.
SULLIVAN
(33 VIEWS)
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