¶4. (C) On the issue of police reaction, Mudzingwa said
that they were confident that the majority were now either
sympathetic to the MDC position or determined to remain
neutral if at all possible. He was somewhat concerned about
a few special units who have apparently received riot
training since March or that existing unit commanders would
be replaced by GOZ militants, possibly war veterans.
Mudzingwa said he thought the MDC's propaganda aimed at the
army, as well as private conversations with selected army
officers, had worked and that the greater part of the army
was inclined to remain neutral – though all uncertainties on
this front had not been eliminated. On the whole however, he
believed that the MDC strategy would avoid confrontations by
assembling and disbursing too quickly for the GOZ forces to
be a problem.
¶5. (C) Comment: In theory Mudzingwa's plan sounds viable
but it relies heavily on very good organization and
communication, and the willingness of sympathetic police and
local authorities to remain apolitical even if they get
advance notice that a demonstration is imminent. Its
avoidance of marching/demonstrations near State House or city
center would be less neuralgic to authorities. The plan also
relies on holding demonstrations in distant locales and
spreading militant security forces too thin to respond
effectively. Word travels fast though, and a harsh crackdown
in one suburb could quell peoples' willingness to take to the
streets in others. The MDC has a very limited track record
of getting people to march, and it is unclear whether general
frustration and desperation is enough to make notoriously
patient Zimbabweans take to the streets in huge numbers.
¶6. (C) In light of the fact that to date Mudzingwa, though
very well-placed in the MDC hierarchy, is the only source to
report any action is planned before Monday, Embassy observers
remain skeptical that any major events will take place over
the weekend. End Comment.
SULLIVAN
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